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THE POLITICAL THEORIES OF MARX AND ARENDT AS A RESPONSE
requiremcl1tsforlhcdcgrceof
Memorial University Newfoundlnnd
Inthisthesis.larguethatthepoliticaltheoriesofKariMarxandHannahArendtcanbe
interpreted as responses to Kant who, in attempting to conceive of how freedom could be
possible in the face of Humean scepticism. concluded that freedom was only possible
outside of the phenomenal world. I argue that they share a foundat ion in that their
political theories are ultimalely responses to Kant. both of them rejecti ngtheontological
precedence given by Kant and rhe majority of the Ihinkers lhroughoullhehistoryof
philosophy 10 Iheabslract properties of reaSOli andrhollghr in humanity, and instead
onlologizing thepracrical. From lhisontological shift. Marx and Arendl ultimately
grounded humanness in lhepracricalandthe worldly. by showing thatallhoughHume's
scepticism about freedom with respect to Ilecessiry may becorrcct ,frccdom is. at base. a
procticalqllcstion wilh respect to CO/lstraim, and it isonlyhyconsidering it in this light
thntfrccdomcanbcadcquately'brollghtback'tothc'phcnomenal'world
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political philosophy. I must also thank my assessors. Dr. Walter Okshevsky. Dr. Suma
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We only become whal we are by IheradicaJ and deep-sealed refusal of
ToJook for my happiness in Ihe happiness of others. for my own
others-lhm ismy whole faith. the aspirmioll of my whole life
The socio·political notion of freedom-its characterization and the subsequent
conception of how bes((oachievei(-has becn a major lopic of philosophical inquiry
havingbecn given by Plato and summarized in his cave allegory in The Republie. Yet
dialeclicism) wilhin which theorisrs generally agree. it is fair 10 say th31 3 universally
acceptedconeeplion of freedom is very faraway. if it could be conceived of at all. l
Moreover. like mosl topics Ihal are oUlside thescopc of the naturnl scienccs.itisnolclear
tre:Jtment's validity must be substantiated upon rational argumentalion.
So begins Kant's preface to his 1780 piece Th~ M~/aphysicaJ EJ~m~nls 01 Elhics. Of
Yet it is also evident that politics and political theory is also a practical philosophywitha
longtrnditionJargelystartingwithPlato'sRepllbJicandevolvingover the course of
nearly 2500 years. 1t shouJd thus be important that thc metaphysicaJelemenlSofpolitics
lhisJrescarchesinlhcfieldofspeculativephilosophy,'o.lwhaIK.lRtimmcdialelyhadin
mind was Ihemanner in whjch 1·lumc·s£nquiryCollcemillgHumauUllderstandillg
'proves' thai theconcepi of cause andeffecl"is really nOlhingbutabaSlardoflhe
imagination,which,impregnatedbyexperience,andhavingbroughlcertain
rcprescntalions under the law of associalion, passes off the resu Iting subjcclive necessity
(i.e.. habit) for an objeclive necessity (from insighl)."·4Whatisimponanlforlhcpurposes
of the present thesis, however, is not the manner in which Kantdisentangles reason from
this 'Humean problem', but rather the repercussions that Kant'sanalysishasindcaling
sophistry."~Hume contends,
~David Hume, All Enquiry Concerning Hilma" U"derstanding (Kitchener
BatochcBooks,2000),56
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ontologywilhinasocio-polilicalconICXI.lhelypcofomologylhatlamconcernedwilh
here is, of course, humoll onlology (I will referloitsimplyas'on tology'rromlhispoint
on);th31 is. an inquiry analogous 10 those just mentioned above.exceptlhalitshouldbe
specijiclohumollexislellce.Thatis,itshoulddealwithqueslions such as"what.
precisely, does it mean for something toexisl os a hllmall beillg?"' or "whatproperties
deji"eollelObeo hllmollbeillg1" It is. of course. possible 10 appeal to a scientific
"mg'
liberal 10 definition. i.e. a state of being wherein the actions of an individualmaintaina
certain amount ofautollomyor independence from thecontrol ll ofothers; the variation in
specilicnotionsoffreedomisbasedontheformandextcnll2 ofthis(lUtonomy.To brieny
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bring ontology inloconlext with political freedom in an clllirelygcnernlscnse,onemlly
social environments isa lemplingstarting poinl for the interpreI<llion and analysis of
conceplion ofhumaniry will expcctedly repudiale it, and appeal tothe necessity of an
alternative (i.e. socio-politicul) stule of affairs. 1J A few notable exam pies of critiques of
13E.g.... ltheclassical English polilical philosophersJ supposedthat (freedomJ
could not, as things were. bc unlimited. because ifit were, it would enlail a state in which
=':::==::'~::'~=':''=::::'~:~:~'~~~=
ot..hbm,..ot .... ~..k"""'Id ....u""'"..... b,. .... ,...,.,."(Il<rl,",..,._('_.ot
uO<1ly.-'70)
"11_' "","ibu!""" 10 mo<l<nI "",'->phy ..... pOli,,,,., ,h«<y<>._t><
...JUl,....ood.<......"'ncll6«I..... ·.-ofll><"'_.fCltIl_·bt<aI< ...;'h
b1l<l;,..-Jplt.il<ooo(ltly_ "IUI< ..I!l'<.·..... -..pllyoi<1lhadfol_An>IolJ< ..
_._ot.. ...ityo- r o-.ot.vnytlI,....... "rompri... th<,todOOok
otpll,loo<>pIoy...__'<OnIe ,hM.oollw::""""""'."" .... otpililoo<>ploy_
101."'" 1"''J'OO<.......;m• ...cIIO<I,.h;h. ""_"'l<o!oIy ot>Clioo-("''''ncll.
-"The ('<>ftC.", of H,,'Clty- j. TIl. Furml. 110"",,11 ~,,"dl. 3OO~ Tho: ,,,,.,,,,,,", of
(poli',,") ""Ho.ophy ... 1""'" "'-I"'J'OOC...... oimo atld lO.wbI..... ",_hie
:~::-;,ot~j"'Jl"l'UlO'<"'''''lhoori<>ot_M''''''''''''''',''
... ,'c...-bc"""Ocd "" ........ ..-ot ........rOfO lhey"""rcd,nIO
""",,y. ~ "., "'" ~rnply. !MIl. ,,·.,ot.11 "",n'I".".II_.-
(1l_'.LHCi Clt1MCin,." willl..,i"'rooJ"" .... bySl<rl'·IP.I.impn<... I~....
Y""':"'ppl<l"".c.nl"l)'.crott~IlJ.I91.29),l'u"ht:,.->in«the",fOfOth<<<>n<pirinlot
....y will. ",Ilw::....., <ndolo<h_ .. rr-o«., p"'...... "''",., ., ....k<. I... ,nl
d<f"""'.i'i , i• .- ..."U>OI)' ....."'''wh''h..- pc.o«ond .. ,f-
d<f...,.", • ...., illlO ...bj«lh.. ",IIIO-..c:othc'_.IO"".•nh<t"""'CIt
000IIC,1"(1l>ld.. 66~
slaleofaffairsmighlneverhaveexisted16)andmainlaininglhaleven ifmandid begin in
astale. ll His notion of freedom lakes inloaccount the necessity of thissocio-political
unjust:·I'Finally. in Reason in Histor)'.Hegel maintains that images of the 'noble
savage' exist only if we consider 'freedom' abslraclly. i.e. in association with
preconceived nOlionsofwhat the concepl of freedom engenders in our personal belief
system, A more robusl conception of the natural stale of humanity is thaI in which il is on
courselowards ilslelos. which in Hegerscase amounlS to the self-realizationofSpirit
throughthedevelopmentoftheSlate.1'lndeed,ifoncwereloconceiveofanonlology
Ihat wouldcorresJX>nd 10 lhelelosoftheabolilion of the entire social realm and a relum
tothe·noblcsavage'.onewouldbepainting man as nothing more than a pre.historical
animal. It is this idea, namely that 'abstract freedom' is theoretically insufficient to
eSlablish and/or justify the merilSofa political theory, lhat gives added credence to the
contention that the 'metaphysical element" of ontology should play a crucial role in
puningpolitical theory on a frrm footing
The approach thai I takcin my thesis is to consider Ihepolitical thcories of Karl Marx
and Hannah Arendt as theories that derive lheirrespective nOlions 0ffreedomina
manner that is inextricably dependent on their respeclive conceptionsofontology,yellhe
manner in which lheyconceiveoflheirolltologies is of primary importance.lfonelooks
at Iheexamples given above, lhoseofHobbcs, Rousseau,und Hegel. lhey are, in essence.
basedonnnabslracilyconceivedunderlyingmctaphysicthalisgroundcdinreasofl,
ralherthannpracticalconsideracionoftheinlimlllcphysicllidiscoursebctweenhumanity
and ilS worldly cOlltext. In contrast to this, as mcntioncd above, thc political theories of
Ml.IuandArendtaregroundedinapraclical.lllorldlYOIlIologizmiono!hllmalliry.Bythis
I mean thai lheironlologies ancmpl 10 overcomc the problems associated with Kanl's20
I'See. forexample,p. 26.
:J)Marx·sconnectionloKantis.ofcourse,prcdominanllyseenlhroughHegel's
innuencc.Evenso.averyearlylcltertohisfathcrprovidesevidcncclhalMllrX'slinkto
centred around abstract thought and reason11 -but instead with respect to what is
eachOfher.llAt first glance il may seem Ihat Marx and Arendt are odd bedrellows10 pUI
The effect that Marx's political theories have had on the shaping of the political
to the fundamental role that Marx's ideas played in (at the very leastjustifyillgU) the
the Union of Soviet Socialisl Republics in 1922,14 the shadow that Marx has cast over the
and RussiH thaI have persistcd even 10 this day:!.S: highlights include IheSpacc Race, the
ColdWar,andtheriscofMcCarthyisminthcUnitedStates,Yel,the rapid evolution of
neilheropenly purported to being 'philosophers' in Iheclassical sense,oftenopenly
criticizing philosophy as too abstract and limil..ing.
Russia politically and economically has also come at a price: thetensionbctween 'the
West' and 'the Eastern Bloc' has been fueled in part by political exchanges arising from
Western governments criticizing the Eastern bloc for being 'undeomcnltic' and/or
'Oagrantly violating human rights'?6
On the other hand, Marx's theories themselves are open to nn array of
interpretationslhat have resulted in an equally vast array of Marxist schools-e.g.
Leninism, Trotskyism. Maoism. eo-Marxism, Post-Marxism, etc.-that emphasize
different fundamental points and/or apply Marx's ideas in slighllydifferent ways. One
merely needs to look at the manner in which recent theorists such as Antonio Negri in
KapitoJ, and The Communist Ma"ifesto as being of primary importance. In the
Marxism has also to be recast at a more purely theoretical level. In panicular,itis
now evident that thedialeclic is too simple and clumsy an instrumenttoaccounl
·••. on,.
sy' today.
19' 1.248.
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strcnglh enables him topcrform lhcm is by nature a slave";28 those lheoriesthalhavc
21ArislotJe. The Polirics(Baltimore: Penguin Books Inc .. 1962). 26
somcthingofa 'separation of church andstatc' withinlhcirpolit ics largeiy give primary
Benhabib,andJilrgen Habermas.NWith regard 10 the present lhesis,Arendt was also
approach)O-thus there ex isis adynamic between Marx and Arendl that provides ready-
made comparisons and conlrasts that further help to emphasize Ihe primary
Hegel's selr-other relulionshipJ' on Iheonehand. and itscritiqueorcapit31ismandthe
'hus:''''h,
inlo'labour'.'work',und'uction',andherjuslificalionsfortreuling'uclion'as
onlologythalneilherMarxnorArendtwouldagreewith. l2 SecauseofIhisapproach,l
to their ability to nourish as put forward by Ihc theorisl inqucstion:forMarx,itisrelated
tothealienationoflabourfoundincapilalism.whileforArendtiI has 10 do with a lack of
opportunity for the individual to engage in genuine political action. Of course. both of
themselves; for Arendt, political action requires discourse wilhina larger social milieu
bringingaboulandlorrealizingsuchnolionsoffreedomwilhintheworld.JJ
queslionofhis work, namely. the relation oflhc individual lothecommunily."lGould·s
theory of the nature of social reality:·2Indeed. the most nalUral place 10 begin a
reality' thai cOnlexlualizes Ihe individual) and justifies the manner in which freedom
IGould. MlIrx'sSocilll Ol/tology. xii
JSince historical materialism makes the stronger claim that the individual in
isolationisavacuousconcepl,i.e.socialrelalionsdefinetheindividualasmuchasthey
Hegel's idealism plays in the foundations of Marx's Iheories.4 8 y ·worldly·.ldonot
fundamental role to play for Marx. especially with respect 10 his nOlionsoffreedom
to-ilsreperctlssiollsi1l,hemmerialworld.S
5<'Socialiife is cssenlially praclical. All mysteries which mislead theory into
mysticism rmdtheirralionaisoiution in human pracliceand in Ihe comprchensionofthis
though this understanding is presupposed in several of his works.7Capitlll,forexample.
use in various ways."8 Labour then ellters within the context ofcommodities:"(use-
useful qualities.''' From a 'c1assical'cconomic point of view (e.g. Locke,Smith,Ricardo,
SMarx,"CapitaI.Vo!umeOne,"303
with'usefuJ properties' that 'satisfy human wants'. However. from an ontologicaJ point
ofview.lhis characterization provides no insight with respect to the fundamental
Two passages from Capiral provide a means to conceive of an ample ontological
characterizationof'laoour': "Laoour is, in the first place. a process in whichoothman
and Natureparticipatc. and in which man of his own accordst3rts. rcgulatcs, and controls
worldandchangingit.heatthesametimechangeshisownnature:'l° and: "By labour·
a use·value of any description:"11 Labour for Marx is thus an overarching structurelhat
value and/or usefulness of the final producl. l1 Thus, Marx's idea of political economy
contains a much moresymbiOlic relationshipbctween labour and value,which is in
contrast to the political economy theories that began with Smith and were later taken up
nations:,IJThis seems to imply that in Smith'stheoryofpolitic<11 economy,'labour'is
this definition, and this rather negative aspect oftheobjectification of labour within the
lJAdamSmith,A"JllquiryimotheNatllrealldCollsesojtheWealthojNarions,
ed, K. Sutherland (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1993),8
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assumes 10 exist outside itself,just as it takes itselftoexisl.',n However, Fichte's
objeclivebeingdoesnotfallfromhisslateof'pureaClivity'inloacrenting of the objccl;
activilyastheactivityofanobjective,nuluralbeing."IIConsiderhiscriliqueofthc
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of man."~1 As will be seen, the main difference between Marx and the 'barrack
communism' theories of Proudhon,Lassalle,etal. that he detested is that ahhoughthese
lhcorics are also based around 'the practical', production remains devoid of ontological
content.nMoreovcr, it is a testament to the acceptance of 'c1assical'economictheories
that critics of Marx (deliberately or not) orten fail to propcrly grasp thisorganicideaof
labour (considering it only in terms of its purely extrinsic (capitalistic) use- and
exchange-value) is also, arguably, at the basis ofa whole host of problems thalarisein
conceptions of Marxism and communism.1J
Z'Marx,£Co1lomica"dPhiiosophicMallllscripfS,89.
Z2Seep.40.
il conceived of this problel1l as merely a theoretical one."24 Marx 'stheoryorhistorical
opposedtonecessity ... isuniversallyallowedtohavenoexislence."usinceitisfounded
development or the individual andorsocicty:lhcsocial relatioIlS thai detinclhe
matcrialislinlerprctalionoftheworldareatlhesamelheresultof.andcontributc to. the
2~Marx,Eco"omic{llldPhilosophicMa,,"scripts.89
2.SScep.3
unfoldingofhistory.Ontheothcrhand,thcmannerinwhichhislory is not simply a
dialecticalprocess.:!6InaccordancewilhlheaClive(and.itmuslbesaid,dclerminislic)
hislorical process is not yet therelllhisiory or man.,,28 As mentionedenrlier. Mnrx lakes
material world renected by the human mind and Iranslated into rormsorthought:'29
philosophy, ethics, elc.. etc., and trace their origins and growth rrom that basis... '·)O
retalionsbetween human beings.,"31 And it is clear thai Ihescrelalionshipsareestablishcd
~Marx,£collom;caf/dPh;losophicMllIllIscr;p/s,I08
29Marx,"Capital,VoiumeOne."30I.
)OMarx,TheGermollldeo{ogy,l64
bccncstablishcdthrough historicalcvcnts: a king is such becauscorhisrclationtolhe
subjects whom he rules over, and royalty and rulershipareeslablishedhistorically
finally thcquestion of which subjecls this king has power over iscstablishedthrough
contexl.3!ln fact, even the presenlation of the individua! with rcspectto/abollris
incomplete without thissocio-historicalcontext,ll
takes an active role iu the evolution of society (i.e. the'histor icalprocess')canbe
properlyunderslood..\4However, since a large part of dialectic ismlendstobeseenin
more 'large-scale' events (a main one for Marx being the fall ofcapilalism), I feel
justified in being fairly brief in my exposition. I have mentioned below that one of
Ludwig Feuerbach's major contributions to Marx's theory is providing the basis for
Marx's notion ofspecies-beiflg, yet Feuerbach's Essence a/Christianity (<Iud its
subsequentre-interpretationintheThesesoIiFellerbach),accordingtoMarx,isalsothe
"critica/foml of [the abstract, logical,speculativeexpression of the movemenl of history,
whichJ in Hegel [isJ still lan] uncritical process" yct "Feuerbachlhusconceivesofthe
negation of the negation only as contradiction of philosophy with ilself:,35 This 'negation
oflhenegation' is a dialectical idea: an imperfect historical realityappears in form, a
negativcaspeclisitselfnegated(antithesis),producinganew'improved'historical
reality (synthesis) devoid of this particular negative aspect; so society evolves. For
example: "lfwecharacterizecommu1Iism itselfbecauseofilscharacterasnegationofthe
through the negation of private property-as begin not yet the !rlle, self~originatjng
position but rather a position originating from private property, [... ]",)6 Of course.
sllbjectively is directly given in a form adequate to the huma" bcing. And as everything
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a great multitude of such forces could find no application at all within this system:"'~
markClplace.~J Yet not only does capitalism force individuals 10 limit themselves in tenns
.2Marx, rheGerma" ldeo{ogy, 185.
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in exchange. lhe labourer who works 10 produce il is given a wage. Yet lhe wage is not
the Objeclificalion of labour, it is only somcthing given in exchange for the objeci. hence
of the objccts mosl necessary nOI only forhislifebul ror his work:046 What was once an
expressionorlhe powers of the individual (and Iherefore of the species)becomes
consciousness isaJienated from her. 10 the point where Jabour. which is supposed 10 be at
as soon as no physical or other compulsion exisls. labour is shunned like 1heplague...470f
conlcxt, the object docs nor go from 3 group of working individu31sloanexlem31
individual whose motive is to sell iton for profit: rather, the fact that it has been produced
through 'one uniform labour-power' givesil value, and,trueto material ism it is the
modification of the social relations within it thai provides the means to understand the
nalureofthe resuhant commodities: "When, Iherefore, capital is converted imocommon
property, into the property of all members of society, personal property is not thereby
transformed intosociaJ property. It is only the social character of the property that has
I have thus far established that Marx's human ontology (which,being materialist,
characterizesthebroadersocialcontextasafundamentalcharacteristkoftheindividual)
is indeed apraClicalone, inspired by and dependent on Iheide3that webecomeawareof
ourselvesthroughtheexrernalizariofJofourpowersthroughthemodificationofthe
powers that Ihe individual (and,transitively, Ihe spccies) must possess, namely those that
arerequircd to make said modifications. I will turn now 10 my annlysis of Marx's
resulwnl conceplionofa 'free' society where individuals inhabilingsuch a socielywould
nol only be allowed to express their powers freely but, moreover, Ihat Ihey would be
plngue' (u stalcofaffairs that is broughl about, Marx argues,bycapitalism).Moreover,
sllch a future social conception should also convey the highest formofcollective
cooperation because of the importance Marx gives to the species and species-
consciousness 35 a whole. This notionof'species-consciousness' is key 10 Marx's
4Marx,ManijesroojrheCommunisrParty,485.
conceplionof·freedom·. for he was one of the strongest crilics of communism as being
merely an egalitarian society based on equal dispersionofresou rces.Thelinderstanding
of Ihese theories of whal Marx lermed 'barrack' or 'crude' communism provides
importanlcontraststoMarx'sownlhought,especiallywilhregardtowhat is IIOf. for
conceived as an absuactcapitaJist:'""IlnhisCrifiqlle o/the Gotha Program. Marx
·fairdistribulion.·~ which he crilicizes because "one man is superior 10 another
longer time.... Thus, wilh an equal performance of labour, and hence an eqllal share in
"9Marx, EcollomicandPhi!osophicMallllscripts, 80
richerlhananother.andsoon.'·SI I have already mentioned Marx's other problem with
this oversimplification found in 'vulgar communism' in the first chaptcr: wages may
rcimbursc the worker for the mater;al labour that he puts into the project. but theycannol
compensate him for the OIl1oJogicaJ diminution that occurs from the part of his
use·value."S2Moreover. it is difficult to justify the act ofexchanging itself unless it is
eventually done so for its utility, i.e. use.villue,S3 so with respect to commodities, any
52Marx."Capital.VolumeOnc:·305
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labour. and conlributes 10 theestrangemenl of labour and its products:"Thecharaclers
that stamp products as commodities. and whose establishment isa necessary preliminary
to thecirculalion of commodities. have already acquired theslabililyofnatural.self.
understood forms of social life. before man seeks [0 decipher. not their historical
character. for in his eyes [hey are immutable. but [heirmeaning:·je; Thus. when we see
shoes. coats. houses. etc. that we wish toauuin Ihroughexchange• we are already
preconditioned by the existing social bias toacccpt lhemuncri[ically as already having
been deciphered and positioned within the hierarchy of commodities. The bias that
contributes to thisoversimplificalion includes the uncritical acceptance that in most
cases. (a) the product is estranged from its producer(s) (especially ifit is the productofa
mechanical routine. like that found in an assembly line); thus the anonymity oflhe
producer necessarily implies the unexceptional nature of Ihat parliclllllrmanifestalionof
the product: and (b)lhereexistsanextemallypre.-detenninedstandardiz<ltionofthe
valuationoflhc producl:thus. it is seen primarily as rencctingame1lllS for the COIISllmer
rather than Ihc pOll'ers of the producer
ASlllluded toprcviously, Kant'sconccptionoffreedolll was inspi red by the
problelll that cnusnlity and necessily posed to the phenomenal worId. Thus. approaching
lhe problem from theonlological vantJgepointofreasoll.hesurmised:··allaclionsof
ralional beings. inso(aras lhey are appearances (are encountered in some experience or
other). are subject to natural necessity: bUI the very same actions. withrespectonlylothe
~arx.··CapitaJ.VolumeOne:·324
rational subject and its faculty of acting in accordance Wilh bare reason.arefree:·S7 Thus
3c1ose:,jlFreesociety(i.e.emphasil.ingthesocio/ratherthanthepo/ilico~.then.asit
S7Kant.Pro/egomello.97 [345)
5I(Marx.'·PrefacetoaContributionlolheCritiqueofPoliticaIEconomy." in The
MlIrx-ElIge/sRellder, 5)
link between products isstiJl maintained.61 This is inconlrast tocapitalisticor'crudc'
mainlains thc anonymity orthc producer.6l Compicmcnting this conscious labour is its
~'hisisnotsodirriculttoseeironcconsidersidealizcdfamiliaI conceptions or
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I hnvethus fnrcharacterized the emergellrcommunisl society and the freeing of
theindividunl from bourgeois capitalism. but I haveyettoconsiderwhal happens after
this. and to what end. The ontological presuppositions (for Marx) ofproducriollwithin
the context of the polentiality of the human spteieS-coIIsciollslless through its
extemaliuujon in labour is necessary for the realization of human freedom. but thus farl
have only spoken of the manner in which thc spccies can begill todemonslratethis
potentiality through the establishment ofcoopcrative. conscious. non-alienat inglabour.
Yet. for MarJI:. thiscooperativelabourslilJ includes (and must include. see below)
acts of necessity where we as a species remain tied to nature. Bccausethebasisofhis
philosophy is a critique of theories of political economy and their relalionship to
capitalistic modesofproduclion, Marx says liuleabout the development of the future
communisl society once it has been established. However, he gives agiimpse into the
devclopmentoflhisfreesocietyneartheendofVolumclllofCopiroJ
"Marx."Capital,VolumeThree:·inTJJeMarx.Enge/sReader,443
Thischarncterizationofhumanilyincontradislinctionlonalureisoound up in a myriad
of ways with the ontology Ihal has beenslressed throughout the section. Human beings
are the only creatures able 10 lranscend nature Ihrough complex forms ofproduclion,lI6 so
ofa society where humans labour freely and cooperalively. Ihe free society canembrace
devoted to ranning, sanitation, diseasecontrol,ctc.68 Thc evol ution or creative power not
labourorolhersby means or such appropriation las bourgeois propcrtyandcapital]";l>9
69Marx. "Manifesto or the Communist Plirty."in The Marx-E"gels Reader.486
bcing."70And,indeed,Gould maintains: "Although an individualcannol become free in
individuals.,o71 Gould sums up Marx'sconceplionoffreedorn thus
leaving humanity as an 'esoteric predic<lIC',7J His eleventh and final "Thesis on
h3veoniyill1erpreredthcworid,invariouswayS:lhepoint.howevcr.is lochallgeil:·...
"Seep.26
Despile Arendt's praiseoflhe manner in which Kanl 'saved freedom ,"itisevidenlthat
freedom is an anribule of will and lhought Oluch rather lhan ofaction:'! Arendt's
'Seep. 3
but has no aim olhcr than to make possible the philosopher's way 0 flife,"JMoreover, it
considered a critique nol only of pol iiical economy. but of Marx' s subsequenl critique
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and spoken word.''' Because of this. and perhaps in some sense as aconsequenceoflhe
·glorific'llion' of labour being touted lls"the supreme world-bu ilding capacity ofman:' lO
assimiJalionwilholher'professions' asameansto'makea living. '11 Arendt holds that al
mould) l!le socio-political context within which hurnansact. 12
definesthem ll); rather. she denies the that it should have any sort ofhigherontoJogical
;nI<lk<;<..I__,"yelwoool<tl<l>_.prop<td'.'..... .,(IIum>npno<l><a"""'ld
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eating,growingfood,etc.,'Swhilst'work'relatestoanythingbuiItthatis'unnatural'such
for remembrance, that is. forhistory."19
logcther, ..2J)politics (which derives itselffroJ1l lhcpolis) soleIyintermsorgovemance21
traditional theories of political economyll) is thus rejected by Arendt. She begins by
19Arcndt, The Human COllditioll.8. Of course. this is not a division IhutMarx
would accept
the reaJity of the world andourselves,"2J Building from this premise. she characterizes the
[whichJ has the twofold character of equality and distinction"Nisc!ear. for "if men were
nor action to make themsclves understood"2S (since they wouldalready know each olher).
important to Arcndt: thus,"the primordial and specifically human act muSI al the same
limeconl3intheanswertolhequestionaskedoreverynewcomer:'Who are you?' This
disclosure of who somebody is. is implicit inbol.h his works and his deeds:''''
Throughout The HlIman Condirion. Arendt strcsses the importance ofnaraliry as a
key justification ror her giving ontological precedencc to action: hencetheemphasison
the·newcomer·isveryimportant.Atnotimeareweabletopaintapreciseportraitofour
intemalworkings,soateveryill5tancel.hatstoriesareshared.somethingnewcomesto
Jight.eitherthrough the sharing of new data about ourselycs. or giving precedenceloold
data, and thus reflecting what is important to us:eycn if there existedthecapacityto
things,andhavenewthoughtsandideas.ltistruclhalanimalsalso'change'and'grow'
in ccrtain ways overtime, trees and plants maturc. rocks and earth erode, elc.:yelcentral
10 Arcndt"s philosophy is 'the human condilion'. As opposed to every 0Iherobjccland
spccieSlhulcxisls,"menareconditionedbeingsbccauseevcrything Iheycome in contact
with turns immediately into a condition orlhcircxistcncc,,,n Al I objecis and animals are
pcrccived by hUll1ans asu'part ornaturc', forming anexre,."alontologicatcomponenlof
'hislory' is entirely nnlhropocentric: it isbascd upon how humans are afrected by humans
or by nalUre. Humans are the only beings that history ischaracterizedinrelat;otlro
Hislory,moreover,isalllhatprevenisusfrombeing'memoryless'beings.Withoul
hislory.therecanconceivablybenomorelhandevelopmenlsolelywilhinlhegeneralion
inque5lion: knowledge would be limited 10 whalcould be immediateIydemonstraled.
andanylhing forgotlen would be 1051 unlil independently rediscovered.ltisl.hrough
speech and aClion that we are able loconceiveofhumanily beyond such a primitiveslale.
Moreover. il is only lhrough lherecorditlg of speech and aClion Ihroughout history Ihat
we can Ieam and evolve as h"mallity r3ther Ihan simply exist as primitivebeingswilhour
knowledge being eilhercomplclely isolatcdor. at be5l. limited 10 smallcommunilies.:!I
The manner in which Kanl's melaphysics allows for freedom. as has been
menlioned. is to circumvent detenninism in the phenomenal worldby arguing fora
meanstoinilialeasequenceofeventslhatdoesnolhaveanevenlimmedialeIybeforeit
thaldelenninesitcomplelely:"Should ... freedombeapropenyofcertaincausesof
appearances. then that freedom must. inrelalion 10 Ihe appearance as events.beafaculry
ofstartingthoseevenlsjromirselj(spollle),i.e.wilhoutihecausalityoflhccauseitself
having to begin. and wilhout need for any other ground todetermine its beginning."29
This. Kant argues. is only possiblc within thenoumenal realmcharaclerizedby'pure
~anl.Prolegomena.95[344J
oppeorollces:'YJSince'purethought'isacnpncityfoundonlywithin 'intelligent bcings',
philosophy as well since humans initiate these spollre events from thought.31 Arendt's
interest in Kant"s 'political philosophy' (which, she admits, he 'never wrote'J2) has
sometimes one word, suffices to change every constellation,'3l is debatable: in The
maintaining, for example, lhat aCling is synonymolls wilh "slart ing processes of our
own,'·;lolThistransitiverelationship, from!reel/om toacrio1l 10 srarri1l8 new processes.
interest' ."J~ Kant's idealism thus manifests in the physic<\1 world via the manner in which
'purethought' and hence a glimpse intothenoumenal realm isexpressedinobjetsd'art.J6
in himself in Kant's political philosophy."n
process of achieving freedom)8 bUI ultimately sees theemancipalion of labour as
in the direction offreedom.,,)9 Ontological precedence.lhen, isg iventoaction«lsince"of
ofucting.''''
3llSee note 59, Ch:'lplcrI
this multiplicity that is important to Arendt is somewhat different from Marx, e.g
to be deprived of the capacity to act'-4! in the sense that those deeds thatmaybcdoneona
Rousseauan human bcing of the Discourseon/"et/llolity.l,l Thus. in accordance with
entirelydependentuponlheconsl3ntpresenceofothers:'44 ltisevident thus thul,ina
and not merely something-Ihirst or hunger, afreclion orhostil ityorfcar.'>4sYelactioll
namelypoliticaf action. entirely encompasses ArendCs conceplion of freedom.<WI
modcrn world41 lies in whal she describes as the unfree natureoflhe priv:ltc realm
where all membcrs have goals lhat are largely held in common and arespecificlotheir
situation. As Arendt cxplnins, "thedistinclive lrait of the household sphere waSlhat in it
mcnlivedlogetherbecausctheywcredrivenbylhcirwantsandneedS.,,48Allhoughall
individuals.Theexistenceofapublicdomaindisfillcfjromfheprjvareho/uehofd,49 a
domain where stories can bc shared andpoliticaldiscoursecangoon (as opposed to
complex social aspeci of public action that sets humans apart from animals,j()and,whilst
ge"eris."Sl h has already been maintained abovethnl Arendt'st reatmentorpolitical
Arendt it is lhrough action lhat IheindividuaJ answers Ihequeslion"whoareyou?"S2
Sl$cep.26
as some rormorunbounded ability to do whatever one wishes-Iempting as iI may
be-is,al the very leasl,ontologicallysuspect. Yet this 'abstract freedom' is commonly
conc!usion thai human existence is absurd:'lllndeed, Ihefundamenlalteleo!ogical
conceptions seen in Hobbes, Rousseau, Hegel, and, (from Arcndt"s assessment) MarxSl
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positionwilhilsattendingaspectsandperspectives."nltisonly through the
lhe heart orlhe precedence given loaction.sslndeed. it is only th roughbeginningancw
lhe bounds that lhehuman species has sel rorilselral any given lime.!9
ss-rhis 'beginning anew' is Arendl'sconcept orllowliry
~:<amplesorthisphenomenonmighlinciudelheFrenchorAmerican
i"",which"""P<>.'~"OUIoft""dort.... of""It<""'"",""nce,,,,,,,,,,,,wlhl"
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families organized into the facsimile of one super·human family iswhatwecall'sociely.'
and ilSpolitical form of organization iscalled·nation·.··6.!Thus.Ihelemptaliontodefine
form in the nation-state.'..u In fact, for Arendt. political economy (which maintains an
definition.'-64 Political economy therefore has no place in Arendt 's Iheory since political
forcxample,asocietyof'labourers'or'workers'.65 lthasalready been mentioned thaI
Arendt sees 'humanness' in those who prefer immortal fame to mortaI things, and this is
a single deed but, on the contrary, can grow whilcitsconsequcncesIIIultiply.'-.fI7
betwecn3ctingandspcakingmen.inexistence.... Whilestrcngthisthenaturalqualityof
vanishes the moment they disperse.,o6I The rJtionale behind Arendt'scriticism of Hobbes.
should exist at 1111: those in a position of strength-whether they bc one or more feudal
monarchs or an aristocratic body of philosopher-kings as conceived of byPlatol\l)-desire
can be usurped.'70Clearly, iflhosewhoruleoverothers wish lO maintain theirposition,
least. as lhe interplay is alive and hasnol resuhed inaslalemate.,,11 The inlerplaythat
developmenlofhernolionoffreedomaspolilicalaclion.oncistempiedtoask'iowhal
end is this action directed?' or 'what is it lhal is to be achieved through polilical actionT
Indeed, Arendt is well aware ofthetemptalion to ask suchquestions:''The
extraordinarily narrow horizon of experience left open 10 us for lhe politics
commensurate wilh lhe experiences ofourcenlUry perhaps reveals itselfnowheremore
clearly than inlhefact lhat we are automatically prepared toqueslion the meaning of
politics the moment we become convinced lhat action has neither an end nor a goal:,n It
isclearl.hat Arendl5eeSlheexercisingofpolitical3Ction (in and ofiLSeIO asequ ivalenlto
freedom and hence it is nrerelylhis perpetualion Ihat is necessitated by Arendt'snotionof
freedom. For Arendl, to ask for an end orfinaJe Ihal poJiticsshould bring us lowardisa
neither does it lie in thefulure. Jfit is at all achievable. il mustremain conslantly in the
present. and precisely during limes when it is nOlyet achieved:'7) Moreover. Arendt's
lamenling Oflhisdesire 10 seek a 'goal' also sheds some light on hercriticismof
modernity,e.g.:''Thegrowingmeaninglessoflhemodcrnworldispcrhapsnowhere
more clearly foreshadowed than in this identilicalionofmeaningandend;"74 spcc ifically
Morxism: "What distinguishes Marx's Qwn lheory from ull other sin which lhe notion of
'mukinghistory'hasfoundaplaceisonlythathealollcrealizedthat if one lakes history
tobc lheobject of processes of fabrication or making. there mustcomea moment when
'UArendt,"TbeConcepl of History," 302.
this 'object' is complelcd"l'; and modern polilics:"Whenever we hearofgrandioseaims
in polilics. such asesl:.lblishing a new society in which justice will bcguaranleedforever,
moving in the realm of this kind ofthinking:'16
It is apparent that, although there are some basic similarities between Kant's
notion ofspome and Arendt's conception ofltoraliry, the worldly natureofacliolt and the
manner in which action aJone, according to Arendt. allows freedom to be realizable
cannot be brought into step with the ontological primacy given to reason and its
corresponding otherworldly nature as found in Kant. Moreover. the only rneansby which
Kant is able 10 establish a connection between these 'noumena!' and 'phenomenal"
realms is through the·fabrication·ofobjersd'orl,and it is clear that thc'neeting' and
'non-pennanenC nature of action. combined with itssocio-political nature (as opposed 10
t.he'disintercsledpleasure· thai can be begot from art in isolation)renden Kant's narrow
'worldly freedom' solely as a certain manifestalion of Ihe vita conumplaliva as
uhimalcly unacceptablc to Arendt. The very fact that Arendt underlines the important of
thepo/ilical within apub/icspace where individuals purposively intenningleinorderto
share their personal idiosyncrasies, experiences, and 'stories' requires,at the very least,
anextenwfizmioll of the conceptions begottcn by thollght nnd rea SOli in Kant's
Yet thcfinal and perhaps1110S1 irnportant llSI>cctofArcndt's political thcory that
goes against a 'Kantinn' conception of theory and praclice is th1IlKnnt"sresignationto
determinism in the phenomenal world and corresponding relegation 10 freedom in the
noumennl world imply a corresponding resignation of worldly nffairs to whatever is
dictated to it. To resign oneself to a conception of'worldly' freedom Ihal is solely
defined in terms of its connection 10 this otherworldly noumenal realm (i.e. through
Phenomenology Reader, cd. Dermot Moran and Timothy Mooney ( ew York:
Rou~cdge. 2002J. 357)
contemplalion. which COil be done in isolalion) allows for those in positionsof'strenglh'
to arbitrarily exercise Iheirconlrol over others wilhin the immedialesocio-polilical
framework. Jna Kanlian sense, this can be seen tojuslify the whollyolherworldIynature
offreedom,since'conlror,whetherphysicallylhroughothersormetaphysicaJlylhrough
delerminism. is already implicit in thephenomenaJ reaJm and lherefore is nOlaconcem.lI
Given, for example, Arendfs writings on tOlalil3rianismnnd the Eichmann lrial. it would
befairlyeasyloassertthatanytheorythatcouldimplYlheexislenccofsuch'wor1dly
control"muslberejected.lndeed.suchatheoryprecludeslheimpetustoactivelycome
together in a public space. allowing for·slrength· ...the naturnl qualilyofanindividuaJ
seen in isoJation"19 but precluding thc'power' Ihal such a coming.together ordains on a
given population. Because of the importance of 'power' and lhe manner in whichArendl
argues foril asa requiremem not only for freedom bUI also, perhaps, for survivaJ. il is not
surprising that Arendt should nOI besalisfied with the nOlion of'freedom'foundinKant
7'9ArendI.Th~HllmanCondirion.200

Kanl'sdefinilionconlainedmelaphysical'enlilies'th3twcrccapableofspollte.i.e.could
bc'uncaused'andhencccircumventlhcyokeofdeterminism.Asmuchas this provides a
implies that wilhin Ihe physical realm we must resign ourselves to this yoke of
Hegel on his head,'1 concluding that il was not the realm Oflhoughl lhatheldprccedence
wilh Ihephysical and man's relationship to nalure. Marx concc ivesofapracrico/.social
ontological primacy within humankind, r3therthan lherarioflol, IIoll-physicolontologies
conceived of throughout much,ifnot all. of the history of philosophy. Arendt's political
philosophy rooted in the vitaacliva is also a rejection ofthis'ontology of reason', an
ontology that. she argues, has manifested itself throughout philosophy as the
diametricallyoppositevilocomemplatb..a. Yet although Arendt's philosophy is rooted in
thephysical·worldofappearances'.shealsorejectsthe idea that freedom should be
ultimately found in the nOli-physical aspects of lhe physical world. i.e. action and speech.
langible, and always utlerly fragiJemeaning isdeslrOyed."l In otherwords. the problem
of necessity that led to Humeconclusionsand held such importance for Kant and the
idcalists is not 'solved' in the sense that an improved orahemative means by which
freedom from nccessitycan be realized in the physical world. Instcad itisshown that this
issue ismerelytileorelical, and its importance should be usurped by the question of
woridshouldbcintcrpreted,r<llherthanworryingnboUllllctaphysicalqucstionsofthe
COllditioll(e.g. thechapteron'labour,J)havebeen wriuen as acritical response to Marx
BOlh thinkers are similar in Ihal they do not oogin from a hypolhelicaI pre·socia! Siale.as
the social conlraCI IheorislS did,'" or from a Iheislic or historicallybiascdcharacterizalion
oflhe world5 but inslcadconsider what dislinguishes the capabilities of human beings
from those ofolher animal species. In both cases, their focus is 011 examining the
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animals. In addition, Marx and Arendl strongly underline Ihe importance of the
multiplicilyofhumanity (i.e. the fundamental role that Ihe 'other' plays) in establishing
theironlologies.' Ofcourse,lhe difference between the two is clear: Marx gives
precedencetolabour,and,transitively,towhalhetenns'labour.power'andthesocio-
economic relations thai it implies, and, while noting the importance of political
emancipation as an "important slep:' he criticizes politics as a 1001 for bourgeois
inlereSIS.lncontrasl,ArendlseeSlhat 'labour'7 is impcrmive 10 survival, bUI maintains
lhat ildoes not provide any ontological meaning with regard lo'humunness'.Sheinslead
mainlainslhalpluralityandhigherfonnsofabslractcommunicution,whicharenolfound
in animals, should define humansonlologically,
Although I have limited my focus 10 providing, amongst other things, acriticaI
summaryoftherolethatapraClicalontologyplnysinthepoliticaltheories of Marx and
Arendt and Ihe manner in which they conceive of freedom, a primary mOlivation for
choosinglhclopic in question is to give credcl1ce to lhccrilical 0bservulionofArendl's
mcnlionedinChaplerll,namelythat 'thepracticnl' has in mnnyrcspcclsbcenrelegalcd
'Here, of course, I mean Arendt'sdetinition of labour. See, e.g. thcAppendix
10 Ihcadminislrative and bureaucratic practice of governance.' Indeed,evenoneoflhe
Revcrsingthislrendofpassivilyisevidentlycrucialloupholdingthepluralityof
with whatevcrplc<lsures naturc will yicldthcm. live and die like animals..·1o
IOSeenotc50,ChaplcrJI


one to dismiss all political policies or theories as merely arbitrary. In addition. such
policies may be regarded with cynicism due to suspicions that their primary goals include
hidden ulterior motives that are solely in the interest ofa few and/ormay turn out to be
I have focused on the philosophies of Marx and Arendt preciselybccause of the
acrive form that their respecliveontologies take, and lhemanner in which they are in
contrast to the treatments of human ontology throughollt much ofthehisloryof
philosophythalfocusonlhoughlandreason;andthernannerinwhichthis'radical'
conception of ontology translates 10 an equally radicaldeparture from traditionlll
conceplionsofpolilical freedom. In lhissense, within mythesis is also an attempllo
juslify the importance of ontology (and thus a 'groundingofpraclical philosophy in
melaphysics',as Kant accords) as a means towards developingtheoreticalrigourwithin
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citizenry-but lhrough lechno!ogy:'l On lhesurface. it seems lhat lheonly plausible
condilionofhumanlifc'04:uveryperplexingconundrum,indecd!
depriving it through consumption. Yel. 3ccording to Marx by changing nature,"heat the
insofar as nature moves backward seems to contradict Ihe mutual relationshipbetween
man and nature, Moreover. her idea that Mar,x.'s aim is that consumplion be subsumed is
nagrnntlycontradicted by the Grundrisse pa5sageciled at the end ofChapterJ.'wherein
it is evident that lheonly thing that may beph)'siologicalisnuessar)' labour. and that
when this is minimized, laoourasacreoth'eandcritical process can nourish. This
assessment is upheld by Richard Wolin, who argue for a imilar ontological
misundef'StandinginresponsetoArendt'sconceplionofMarxismassomehowgivingrise
10 somelhing akin to the 'dreary colleclive of mass sociely' alluded 10 at the end of
Chapter I. This includes her claims ofa certain 'nonnalization' process through the rise
of Ihe social: ciling Arendt's claim in The Hllman Conditiollihal Marxism can be lumped
inlothe realm of the social. which maintains"a kind of 'collectivehousekeeping':the
collective of families economicaUy organized into the facsimile of one super-human
'Seep.48.
lRichard Wolin. Heidegger's Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl wwith, Hans
Jonas.ondHerbertMarcuse(Princeton:Princeton niversityPress),64,
Indeed,itisclearfromWolin'sviewthatArendCsmisconceptionhingeson her failure 10
fully concei\'e of Marx's notionoflabourascr~atin~process.
YCI placing the fault of any "mistakes' and 'misinlerpretalions' soleiyalthefoot
of Arendt is not entirely justified, 1be very fact that Arendt appeals to 'the young Marx'
exemplifies a certain confusion that, arguably, arises in theevolut ion of Marx's thought
and his conception of freedom. The extent to which this conception of 'freedom' differs
from what thc 'young Marx' originally had in mind at the time oflhe EcOllomicallt!
Phi/osop"icMallllscriplsisapoimofcontemionthalmaycontributelolhesomewhat
ambiguous lrealmentofwhat, precisely, his nOlion of 'labour' cncompasses, and,further,
why Arendt imerprets his conceplionoflabouras an entirely physiological one, In The
Philosophical FOlilldatiollsojMarxism,LouisDupre begin by echoing Arendt"s
'physiologicar asscssmentoflabour, then concludes wilh asimilarcri licism, e.g,: "In the
dccisivcstagesofman'shisloricalevolution-allhebeginning(the mere salisfaction of
physical needs) and at the end (the final crisisofcapitalism)-only the time and means of
execution depcndon a free choice, Thereccrlninly is noplocc for gonlsotherthanthe
social-economicneccssitjes.FreedomisanesscntinlpurlofMnI'X'S view of man, but no
aucmpl W:'IS made 10 reconcile it with an equollycsscntial social-cconomicdctenninism"
DuprClhencontcnds:"lnthediscussionoflhedivisionoflaborin the Marlllscripts, Marx
himself calls leconomiccooperalionJ asocial fonnofindividualism. To make human
cooperationtrulysocial.Marxshouldhavedcscribedtheoriginalpraxisintennsofsocial
lleeds as well as individual ones, and this cannot be done on a purely physicalbasis"&
However,thisassessmentisentirelybasedonarathernaYveassessment that only lakes
intoaccountthe'youngMarx'(aswellasavery'determinislic'viewofdiaJecficism,see,
e.g. note 32 ofChapler I). and also directly conlradiclS Gould's analys isofMarx's'social
ontology'. In Marx Againsl Marxism. Loewenstein provides a much more mbustand
even-handedunderstandingofthesituation:"NOI inthegool (theconcepcion of freedom]
PhiiosophicMalluscriplsheexpectedtheemancipationfromsociallabouritself.thenin
the Gnmdri$St! in the free tirne reacting back upon produclion.and finally in vol urne
IhreeofCapilOlin a sphere of life that arises out of and moves away from the sphere of
According 10 Locwcnstein, this poses a probtcrn alluded toby Surin inthcintroduction,1O
'Julius Loewenstein, Marx Agai1JSl Marxism. tr. Harry Drost (London: Routledge
&Keg,ni"Jul,191lO),88.
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malerial condilions e1lable the worker 10 change and establish Ihcrea1m of freedom, not
thatilcompe/shimtodoso.1beinexorabiJityofthedialecticaJandhistoricaJlawslhal
'compel' mankind applies only to the deveJopment oflhe economic base and not 10 the
development of man. Marx was never clear about thc fact that thisdevcJopmenlisonlya
polentiaJ:'lI Indeed. this treatment of history in terms of potellfiality rather than
ille,'itability is rigourously developed only much later: forexampIe. by Emst Bloch and
hisconceplionof·Front',Le.lhepanofthcfulurethalisimmediatelyconccivable.rather
than 'far in the fUlure': "Fortheunfinished world can be brought 10 anend,andthe
process pending in il can be brought toa rcsuh;." But nOI by prematurehyposta5eSor
fixed delenninations of essence which only block the way.... The reaJ or the essence is
lhal which does 1Iot yet exist. which is in questojitse/fin the coreojthings, and which is
awaitingitsge1lesisojthetremJlatencyoftheprocess. It is in itseJ fthejust-founded.
objeclively real hope.··u
Thus. one can see why Arendt's development of the notion of 'labour' and
subsequenl criticism of Marx mainlains something ofa narrow inte rprctationoflabour
Arguably,Marx himself did to someextenl originally espouse this view himself. It is
only by considering his more mature thought, especially that which is found in his
Grtlfldrisse (which, likely not by coincidence, is appealed to by many of the more
'modern' Morxist theorists, such as Carol Gould,and Antonio Negri. whose Marx
Be)'olldMarxisbasedalmostentirelyontheGrulldrisse)thaitheseapparent 'problems'
canbedealtwilhpropcrly.Arendl's'mislakc'is,ultimately,lhalshe is unwavering in her
appeaJs 10 'the young Marx' rather than considering his maturethought:whelherlhiswas
merely an "oversight' or was deliberate in order to maintain her criticisms of Marx is
unimportant. What is important. for the purposes or the presenl malerial.isloprovidethe
readerwilh a clear explanation of these "anomalies' in the theoretical dynamic between




